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New book

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Igor Douven, "The Art of Abduction", https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/14179.001.0001 . Looks relevant. 2602:24A:DE47:B8E0:1B43:29FD:A863:33CA (talk) 01:24, 21 July 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Example on inductive reasoning actually a case of abductive reasoning

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From the current article:

For example, if all swans that we have observed so far are white, we may induce that the possibility that all swans are white is reasonable. We have good reason to believe the conclusion from the premise, but the truth of the conclusion is not guaranteed. (Indeed, it turns out that some swans are black.)

From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/:

The mere fact that an inference is based on statistical data is not enough to classify it as an inductive one. You may have observed many gray elephants and no non-gray ones, and infer from this that all elephants are gray, because that would provide the best explanation for why you have observed so many gray elephants and no non-gray ones.

Which source is correct, and how can the adequate revisions be made, if necessary? 81.2.179.53 (talk) 18:48, 10 April 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I don't think the characterisation of induction as inferring a general principle from a body of knowledge is correct (in general) or useful in distinguishing induction from abduction (in fact, it seems to be counterproductive). This claim is found in both the Induction section, and the introduction. Both of these should IMHO be removed from the article.
The example now given for induction (inducing that a specific elephant is gray from a statistical claim on the population of all elephants) doesn't meet this characterisation, while the non-example you mention does.
The article you link is very helpful, particularly this excerpt:
"It suggests that the best way to distinguish between induction and abduction is this: both are ampliative, meaning that the conclusion goes beyond what is (logically) contained in the premises (which is why they are non-necessary inferences), but in abduction there is an implicit or explicit appeal to explanatory considerations, whereas in induction there is not; in induction, there is only an appeal to observed frequencies or statistics. (I emphasize “only,” because in abduction there may also be an appeal to frequencies or statistics, as the example about the elephants exhibits.)"
The second paragraph of the Induction section at least largely agrees with this.
But, note also that the Stanford article makes it clear that it's not universally agreed that inductive and abductive are mutually exclusive ("Harman (1965) conceives induction as a special type of abduction"). This is maybe worth a mention (particularly since the longer quote above does imply inductive logic is often incorporated into an abductive argument in any case).lukeuser (talk) 19:10, 22 September 2024 (UTC)[reply]

There is a section in the article on the formalization of set-cover abduction. However, there is no reference provided for this. I am searching for the original paper that first proposed the set-cover formalization described in that section. Does anyone know what that paper is? Cerebrality (talk) 05:05, 5 December 2024 (UTC)[reply]